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The SHO Goes On: A Theoretical and Empirical Evaluation of
Uptick-Related Short-Sale Constraints
Alex Bylund
07/17/2012
This paper explores the effects of uptick-related short-sale constraints first on the Glosten-Milgrom Model
of Sequential Trade and then empirically on the stocks in the Russell 3000 index used by the SEC in the
pilot program created by Reuglation SHO. Finally, the effect of uptick constraints on the relationship between
the short and put call ratios is studied through the use of impulse response functions. Both the general
and alternative uptick rules are found to decrease informational efficiency in hypothetical financial markets,
have no statistically significant positive effects on key financial market metrics, and the change in sign from
negative to positive in the response of the put call ratio to a positive shock in the short ratio may be seen as
evidence of the use of the options market to avoid short-sale constraints.
1 Introduction
In light of recent events in global financial markets, many financial regulating bodies around the world have
placed limits on and even banned short selling hoping to keep investors from driving down the value of
volatile securities and causing even more instability and uncertainty in many already precarious markets.
One presidential candidate even went as far as to say that short-selling would “turn our markets into a
casino,” (Meckler, 1). Outright bans have been enacted in Greece and Belgium, and rules governing both
the practice of short-selling and which securities are and are not eligible for the practice have been put into
place in Spain, France and the United States. These restrictions are intended to discourage speculation and
disincentivize panic mongering and the spreading of negative rumors.
However, critics of these policies argue that restrictions on short-selling cause prices to not reflect all
available information by failing to include the expectations of those who believe the security will soon
decline in value. This stops investors from being able to profit from superior information and can lead to
distortions in asset pricing. Also short-sell bans can undermine the very confidence and stability they seek
to create. According to said Robert Sloan, a managing partner of S3 Partners, a firm that helps hedge funds
manage relationships with their brokers. “It is a crisis of confidence, and when you do something like [impose
short sell restrictions], it shows a lack of confidence, which is exactly the opposite of what you want to say
to the markets,” (Story & Castle, 1). Furthermore, without regulation of so-called “synthetic short-sells,”
created in the options market using call and put options investors are still free to simulate a short position
regardless of what is and is not explicitly allowed for the underlying asset.
In 1938 the SEC adopted the uptick rule (rule 10a-1), under which securities can be short-sold only at a
price above the last traded price of the security, or at the last traded price if that price was higher than the
price in the previous trade. After testing the rule in 2004 and 2005, a year in which short sales comprised
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as much as 24% of share volume for NYSE-listed stocks (Diether et al., 38) the SEC chose to eliminate the
rule in 2007.
As early as 2008 a bill was introduced in congress (H.R. 6517) to reinstate the uptick rule. Its proponents
argue that the reinstatement of the rule would curtail speculative behavior without the rigidity and price
distorting implications of an outright ban. As recently as 2009 even Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
said, “in the kind of regulatory environment that we have seen recently, [the uptick rule] might have had
some benefit.” (Westbrook). In February of 2010 the SEC amended Regulation SHO, the regulation that
led to the abolition of the uptick rule, to include Rule 201, which is commonly known as the “alternative
uptick rule.” Rule 201(b)(1) provides that “[a] trading center shall establish, maintain, and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to: (i) Prevent the execution or display of a short sale order
of a covered security at a price that is less than or equal to the current national best bid if the price of
that covered security decreases by 10% or more from the covered security’s closing price as determined by
the listing market for the covered security as of the end of regular trading hours on the prior day (SEC).”
The rule is described as a “circuit breaker approach” to the regulation of short-selling, and is intended to
prevent short-sellers from “piling on” a security already facing a precipitous drop in value. On the other
hand, critics of the “alternative uptick rule” argue that because investors wishing to short-sell stocks which
are rapidly losing their value face higher and higher borrowing costs as the stock continues losing value, a fact
that will lead to an eventual halt in short-sell activity and naturally prevent the type of speculation-driven
free fall that short-sell seeks to curtail. It can be argued that there is no need for a “circuit breaker rule,”
which would lead to upward price bias by asymmetrically constraining pessimists (short-sellers) without
constraining optimists (buyers) (Diamond, 279).
In this paper I replicate Glosten and Milgrom’s model in an unconstrained market, in a market subject
to an uptick rule, and a market subject to an “alternative uptick rule.” I then evaluate the difference in price
paths over time in the different scenarios and draw conclusions about uptick restrictions effects on pricing
and rate of price adjustment. I find that, as Xu (2007) predicted, in the presence of short-sale constraints
markets overreact to good information and prices, for better or for worse, adjust upward more quickly
than they would if short-sellers were unconstrained. Then, I will empirically evaluate the efficacy of both
aforementioned types of uptick constraints and their possible effects on returns, volatility, short volume, and
several option-related metrics, as well as whether the rule has a stronger effect on stocks without options.
Finally I create impulse response functions for each stock in the study and the statistical significance of
changes in impulse responses in the short and put call ratios before and after the uptick rule was suspended
and find a change from negative to positive in the response of the put call ratio to a positive shock in the
short ratio after the suspension of the general uptick rule.
2 Short-Sale Constraints in the Glosten-Milgrom Model
The Glosten-Milgrom model predicts how a market maker will adjust the bid-ask spread while interacting
with both informed and uninformed traders. There are no transaction or inventory costs in the model and
the market maker and all traders are assumed to be risk neutral. Traders do not hold inventory and all sales
are assumed to be short-sales. Only unit trading takes place in the model. While this is not a very realistic
assumption, it is necessary in order to make the model simple enough to be feasibly simulated. Individual
cycles of the model are presumed to take place over the space of one day, but are otherwise independent of
time and the model abstracts away discounting. Informed traders are defined by their access to non-public
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information, which in this case is the final value of the asset. Uninformed traders do not have access to this
information and can be thought of as participating in the market for liquidity reasons. In the unconstrained
version of the model the informed trader buys the asset when it is undervalued compared to the asset’s
final value and sells the asset when it is overvalued. Because they are ignorant of the asset’s final value,
uninformed traders are assumed to buy or short-sale with a probability of 0.5 regardless of where the price
of the asset is in relation to its final value.
The model assumes that there is a competitive market for market making services and the market maker
expects to earn zero profit. Because informed traders will only trade when it is advantageous to them, the
market maker knows she will lose money trading with them and adjusts the spread in order to make money
trading with uninformed traders. In the unconstrained version of the model traders buy and sell freely.
When the general uptick rule is introduced a trader can only sell if the price quoted to her is higher than
the price quoted on the preceding trade. In the version of the model governed by the alternative uptick rule
the aforementioned short-sale constraint is applied for the duration of the simulation if and when the asset
falls 10% below its initial value. Traders are assumed to arrive anonymously (i.e. the market maker does not
know if a given trader is informed or uninformed) and one at time. After receiving the bid and ask quotes
from the specialist each trader either buys or sells the stock. Because in the model we have assumed that
investors do not hold inventory, from this point on in the analysis we will assume that the terms “selling”
and “short-selling” are synonymous. After each trade the market maker adjusts the bid and ask prices based
on whether the trade was a buy or sell and then the exercise is repeated.
3 Parameters, Equations, and Model Mechanics
The value of an asset (V) is either a low value (Vdown) or high value (Vup) with probabilities d and (1-d)
respectively. Although the model assumes that Vup is true value of the stock (i.e. the final value at which
informed traders know that the price will eventually arrive), the name Vup is somewhat misleading as Vup
can be set above or below Vdown in order to study the effects of both positive and negative price information
in the model . The probability that a given trader is informed is m. For the purposes of the model, we will
define “being informed” somewhat abstractly as knowing the value of Vup. Alternatively, the probability that
a trader is uninformed is given by (1-m). As previously mentioned, informed traders buy with a probability
of 1 when the stock is V=Vup and sell with a probability of 1 when V=Vdown, and uninformed traders buy
or sell with a probability of .5 regardless of the situation.
Bayes theorem gives us the following equations:
P(V=Vup|buy) =
(1− d)(1 +m)
1 +m(1− 2d) (1)
P(V=Vdown|buy) =
d(1−m)
1 +m(1− 2d) (2)
P(V=Vup|sell) =
(1− d)(1−m)
1−m(1− 2d) (3)
P(V=Vdown|sell) =
d(1 +m)
1−m(1− 2d) (4)
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The ask price is the expected value of the asset given that a buy has taken place, and the bid price is
the expected value of the asset given that a sale has taken place.
Ask=Vdown∗P(V=Vdown|buy) +Vup∗P(V=Vup|buy) =Vdown d(1−m)
1−m(1− 2d) +Vup
(1− d)(1 +m)
1 +m(1− 2d) (5)
Bid=Vdown ∗P(V=Vdown|sell) +Vup ∗P(V=Vup|sell) =Vdown d(1 +m)
1−m(1− 2d) +Vup
(1− d)(1−m)
1 +m(1− 2d) (6)
Before each trade a uniform random variable is generated. In the unconstrained versions of the model
if that variable is higher than d the trade is a buy, otherwise the trade is a sale. If the trade is a buy,
P(V=Vdown|buy) becomes d for the next trade and the sequence is repeated. If the trade is a sale
P(V=Vup|sell) becomes d for the next trade instead. In the versions of the model where short-selling is
restricted traders are prevented from selling and the trade is restarted with a new random variable if the ask
price on the current trade is lower than the ask price on the previous trade. A single trade in this model is
shown below.
4 Results
We will assume that the difference between the Vup and Vdown prices is caused by some event about which
informed traders have additional, non-public information. For the purposes of drawing conclusions based
on model results, we can assume that these divergent expectations are caused by different interpretations
of earnings announcements or some other event. Blau and Pinegar (2009) and Xu (2007) both show that
restriction of short-selling will lead to convex responses to information.
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Figure 1, taken from the aforementioned paper by Jianguo Xu shows that, when short-selling is con-
strained prices will over-adjust to positive information and under adjust to negative information. If we
assume that there is an earnings announcement immediately prior to the first trade, this phenomenon will
be adjustment of prices to their stable values. Additionally, if this theory is robust to different degrees of
uptick restrictions, the price path of a stock constrained by the alternative uptick rule should lie somewhere
between those of the unconstrained stock and the stock that is subject to the general uptick rule. The
following figures were generating by simulating five hundred repetitions of the model without constraints,
with a general uptick constraint, and with an alternative uptick constraint. The parameters used in each
simulation are given above each graph.
5
5 The Relative Effects of Positive and Negative Information
The preceding figure shows two hypothetical market scenarios with identical parameters, but with the
notable exception of vup and vdown being switched in the two scenarios. If we assume vup to be the
informationally correct price of the stock, restricting short-selling prevents the stock price from reaching its
correct value. Presumably, limiting what traders are allowed to do discourages informed traders from trading.
This leaves only uninformed “noise” traders in the market and greatly decreases the informational content
of each individual trade. This is supported by the observation that the stocks traded without uptick-related
constraints in both scenarios reach and remain at the correct price after approximately 275 trades while no
stock traded in the presence of constraints in either scenario ever reaches a stable price. It is worth noting
that prices appear to be more volatile when the true price (vup) is lower than vdown. This is likely caused
by the interaction between the downward pressure from informed traders shorting overvalued stocks and the
constraints placed upon that activity. This friction is not nearly as prominent when the stock is undervalued
because in that scenario only uninformed traders are affected by short sale constraints which are, by nature,
asymmetric.
Also, while the model shows the underreaction to negative information predicted by both Xu and Diamond
and Verrecchia, the overarreaction to positive information theoretically suggested is conspicuously absent.
This occurs because once the model returns vup the value which is compared to a uniform random variable
to determine whether the next trade begins return exclusively the values 1 and 0. As a result, the model is
mathematically incapable of returning a value higher than vup when vup is greater than vdown, or from a
value less than vup when vup is less than vdown. This fact highlights a serious shortcoming of the model
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that limits the model’s ability to mirror the real world, which by logical extension limits the robustness and
trustworthiness of the results produced by the model.
6 The Effects of the Ubiquity of Private Information
Perhaps more than any other parameter, changes in the value of m, which reflect the probability that
a given trader entering to the market is informed (and therefore also the ubiquity of private information),
drastically affect the path of stock prices in every one of the scenarios explored in this paper. Because the
model’s definition of being informed, i.e. knowing vup, is so abstract, it is difficult to pin down a consistent,
measurable way to separate the informed from the uninformed or empirically estimate the value of m for a
given stock. In some situations the cohort of informed traders may exclusively include institutional traders.
In other situations perhaps only insiders know vup. Instead, thinking of m more broadly as a representation
of the ubiquity of explicit material information, and assuming a discrete difference between informed and
uninformed traders such that it is impossible to be “partially informed” affords the model a degree of
simplicity that allows it to be calculable.
In the model, as m decreases price volatility decreases. This happens in part because the number of trades
made on private information decreases the informational quality of each trade decreases. As m approaches 0
the trading scenario comes closer and closer to being pure random noise trading. Once m reaches 0 both the
bid and ask prices converge to 0. At this price the bid-ask spread is 0 and the market maker, having lost the
need to earn a profit uninformed traders to make up for losses incurred from trading with informed traders,
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earn a normal profit. The final outcome of this scenario is a stock price (which in the model is determined
to be the arithmetic average of the bid and ask prices) that oscillates closely around the midpoint between
vup and vdown. Conversely, if m is equal to 1 the process breaks down it can be shown that the ask price,
which is equal to Vdown d(1−m)1−m(1−2d) + Vup
(1−d)(1+m)
1+m(1−2d) , becomes 0. This implies that market makers are no
longer willing to participate in the market and the process breaks down. As m increases the informational
quality of each trade increases, and consequently the speed at which the unconstrained stock price reaches
its equilibrium value.
Finally, even when m is extremely close to 1 uptick-related short-sale constraints still prevent the stock
price from reaching its equilibrium value. Even when the vast majority of investors are informed short-sale
constraints still eliminate informed investors’ incentives to participate in the market such that their influence
is not sufficient to push the stock’s price to its true value.
7 Effects of Changes in Homgeneity of Investors’ Expectations
Because heterogeneous investor expectations are a crucial assumption of the model, the paper would be
incomplete without a study of how changes in the degree to which investors disagree about prices affect
prices paths in the model. The absolute difference between vup and vdown can be used to measure the
degree of heterogeneity of investors’ expecations such that the greater the difference between vup and vdown
the greater the degree of heterogeneity of investors’ expectations.
Unsuprisingly, as the absolute diffrence between vup and vdown increases in the model so does price
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volatility. Because the values of both vup and vdown figure prominently in the calulation of both the bid
and ask spreads in the model it is easy to see how their values can affect way the stocks’ prices change over
time. Bearing in mind that the value of the stock is bounded by the value of vup and that noise trading will
largely lead to flucuations around the midpoint between vup and vdown as the absolute spread between vup
and vdown decreases the range of feasible stock prices decreases. The result is that unconstrained stocks
with low levels of heterogeneity of investors’ expectations converge relatively quickly to their equilibrium
prices and the muddled, largely noise-based trading that takes place in models constrained by both general
and alternative uptick rules move around within a smaller range. The result in each case is a reduction in
price volatility.
8 Part I Conclusions
Unfortunately, only a few of the conclusions given by imposing short-sale restrictions on the Glosten-Milgrom
model are emprically testable. Because it is impossible to pin down any of the key parameter values used
in the model for real securities in real situations, many of the precise quantative results generated by the
model cannot be reliably tested against appropriate real world data. Even in past data it is impossible
to even reliably estimate m, vup, vdown, or d for a given security. However, if the model is a reasonable
approximation of the real world it should be the case that, seeing as constraining short-selling prevents
stocks from reaching equilibrium values, uptick-related short-sale constraints lead to an increase in stock
price volatility. The presence of options and possibility of irrational behavior may also lead to differences
between the results of the Glosten-Milgrom Model and the price paths generated from daily stock return
data.
9 Null Hypotheses
i. In the presence of the alternative uptick rule returns, volume, short volume, and volatility do not differ
significantly from their levels in an unconstrained market.
ii. Even though in the presence of short-sale constraints it is possible to achieve an artificial short position
in the options market, put call ratios will not be significantly affected by the presence of the alternative uptick
rule, negating the case for constraint-induced put-option activity (Blau and Brough, 2011).
iii. Stock-fixed and Day-fixed effects will not be significantly different in an unregulated market and a
market constrained by the alternative uptick rule.
10 Data
“ On May 2, 2005, roughly 1,000 U.S. stocks—so called Pilot stocks—began to trade without
short-sale price tests (Uptick test for the NYSE and bid price test for Nasdaq). These stocks were
selected by the SEC to represent a broad cross-section of the U.S. equity market. The Pilot stocks
were drawn from the Russell 3000 index, comprising every third stock ranked by volume. . . The
experiment was designed by the SEC to investigate whether Rule 10a-1, NYSE’s Uptick Rule,
and Nasdaq’s bid price test affect market quality, and to develop uniform price tests if such rules
were deemed necessary going forward”
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Using data taken at the daily level from the stocks used in the pilot study of the uptick rule implemented
by Reuglation SHO I examine data from 2005 before and after May 2, the day the program was enacted.
In order to study the potential effects of the alternative uptick rule I eliminate all observations which would
not be effected by the rule, that is all stocks with daily returns greater than -10% I further separate the
data into portfolios based on whether a particular stock has an option listed. I then use data obtained from
WRDS to generate a battery of daily, market-quality and short-selling-related activities.
11 Univariate Results
General Uptick Rule Alternative Uptick rule
Non-Short Return Price Non-Short Return Price
return Volume Volatility Volatility Price Return Volume Volatility Volatility Price
Before Before
Mean -.00108 1523303 .0193 .0284 30.54 -.1529 1008513 .0552 .1179 21.64
Std Dev .0234 4628383 .0121 .0182 19.70 .0696 18303312 .0255 .05 16.82
Min -.475 0 .00060 0 1.4 -.475 179543 .0309 .0339 1.76
Max .6789 1.562E8 .2170 .3395 126.4 -.1 1.184E8 .1519 .6216 83.33
After After
Mean .00784 1600823 .0189 .0267 32.12 -.1679 9197657 .0591 .12 18.88
Std Dev .0225 4720435 .0126 .0172 21.04 .0898 21358146 .0293 .0675 17.05
Min -.7175 0 .00026 0 .35 -.7175 3500 .03 .0216 .35
Max .7854 2.893E8 .2386 .6216 205.1 -.1 2.893E8 .2238 .6216 106.6
Differences in means (after - before) Differences in means (after - before)
Diff. .00186** 77820** -.00046** -.00174** 1.58** -.15 -887496 .00387 .00222 -2.76
p-value .0001 .0008 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0887 .675 .1834 .7349 .111
t-stat 16.69 3.36 -7.49 20.35 15.37 -1.99 -.42 1.33 .34 -1.6
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Stocks With Options
As we can see (and confirmed by Deither, Lee, and Werner (2009)), the repeal of the general uptick
rule led to a significant increase in returns, non-short volume, and price, as well as a decrease in price
and return volatility at the daily level. The increase in returns, volume and price support Diamond and
Verrecchia’s (1987) findings that allowing short-sellers to trade unrestricted leads to an increase in the speed
of incorporation of positive news as well as negative news. The decrease in volatility is supported by the idea
that allowing prices to more accurately reflect public information makes them more efficient, and therefore
less volatile. Table two drops all observations in which daily returns are greater than -0.1% in an attempt
to view the effects of an “alternative uptick rule. The tables show that the results obtained for the general
uptick rule are not robust to a test of the alternative uptick rule.
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General Uptick Rule Alternative Uptick rule
Non-Short Return Price Non-Short Return Price
return Volume Volatility Volatility Price Return Volume Volatility Volatility Price
Before Before
Mean -.00111 399537 .0194 .0295 31.31 -.1348 1945028 .0498 .138 11.56
Std Dev .0288 3096171 .0109 .0194 57.38 .0422 2124542 .0138 .0438 11.99
Min -.3847 0 .00036 0 .52 -.3847 6888 .0326 .043 .56
Max .3922 1.5367E8 .1279 .3194 963.5 -.1 3527400 .1146 .3 48.93
After After
Mean .000822 421118 .0197 .02084 32.54 -.162 2317233 .0712 .1571 11.21
Std Dev .0321 3593151 .0126 .0204 57.92 .0838 3895976 .044 .0807 12.84
Min -.7459 0 .000251 0 .4 -.7459 0 .0315 .0236 .40
Max .5066 2.4058E8 .2736 .5682 899.9 -.1 31385649 .2697 .5682 74.33
Differences in means (after - before) Differences in means (after - before)
Diff. .00194** 21581 .00026* -.00109** 1.2331* -.0263* 372205 .0214** .0191 -.3446
p-value .0001 .369 .023 .0001 .0019 .002 .6253 .0001 .0213 .8605
t-stat 12.26 .9 3.05 -7.85 3.11 -3.15 .49 6.01 2.33 .18
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Stocks Without Options
Similar results can be seen for stocks without options but with several important differences. The
presence of the alternative uptick rule leads to a statistically significant increase in average daily returns,
and a decrease in price and return volatility among stocks whose value has fallen at least 10% in a single
day. It is also worth noting that in all 4 cases currently discussed the minimum value of all observations is
much lower in the presence of an uptick-related short-sale constraint, suggesting that uptick rules benefits
companies whose securities are rapidly declining.
General Uptick Rule Alternative Uptick Rule
Short Num Short Put Call Put/Call Short Num Short Put Call Put/Call
Volume Shorts Ratio Volume Volume Ratio Volume Shorts Ratio Volume Volume Ratio
Before Before
Mean 39563 915.8 .2908 753.8 1215.1 .3455 2642861 74723.9 .2985 8662.2 12701.2 .4001
Std Dev 1384527 2622.5 .1454 3530.2 6573.3 .3119 4727463 16639.6 .1542 22579.9 33942.3 .2407
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 62868043 135145 1 153841 471041 1 37917884 135145 1 153847 227161 1
After After
Mean 423650 1142.8 .2991 867.6 114.76 .3469 2802954 6808.1 .3256 5992.6 6488 .412
Std Dev 1481526 2378.1 .1507 4039.7 10986.8 .3042 6101116 10130 .1429 24955.5 22903.1 .0109
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1.2267E8 146712 1 364152 2739057 1 99333118 109889 1 364152 366503 1
Differences in means (after - before) Differences in means (after - before)
Diff. 2796734** 227** .00831** 113.7** 232.5** .00143 1600094 -664.8 .0271 -2669.7 -6213.2 .0119
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .3777 .7883 .5758 .0669 .2847 .0165 .6287
t-stat 3.87 19.05 11.27 5.83 4.55 .88 .27 -.56 1.75 -1.07 -2.4 .48
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Option Metrics
Table 3 shows that the elimination of the general uptick rule leads to an increase in short volume, the
short ratio, put and call volume, and the put call ratio. These results are consistent with the idea that the
elimination of short-sell constraints allows prices to more accurately reflect negative information (Diamond
& Verrecchia (1987)), and option investors should, in theory, be more willing to purchase put options when
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pessimistic short-sellers are not constrained. The increase in call volume may be at least partially explained
by the aforementioned increase in the rate of incorporation of good news into stock prices as a result of
short-sale freedom. Once again, these results are not robust to an “alternative uptick world.” Also, even
though Table I showed a statistically significant increase in non-short volume following the suspension of the
alternative uptick rule, the fact that both put volume and the put call ratio actually increase after the general
uptick rule is suspended suggests that short-sellers were not migrating en masse to the options market to
avoid the restrictions caused by uptick constraints.
12 Multivariate Results
In order to address the concern that an increase in the short ratio and/or option activity around the date
in question may be driven by factors other than a suspension of the uptick rule, I regress short ratio and
put call ratio onto a number of lagged and contemporaneous factors. The regression equations are given as
follows:
shortratioi,t = β1(return_5_1 ) + β2(return) + β3(shortratio_5_1 ) + β4(sigma) + β5(sigma_5_1 )
+ β6(turn_5_1 ) + β7(afShortratioter) + β8(dummy) + β9(afterdummy) + εt (7)
PCratioi,t = β1(return_5_1) + β2(return) + β3(pcratio_5_1) + β4(sigma) + β5(sigma_5_1)
+ β6(turn_5_1) + β7(after) + β8(dummy) + β9(afterdummy) + εt (8)
Where ret_5_1 is 5 day lagged returns, shortratio_5_1 is 5 day lagged short ratio, sigma is volatility,
sigma_5_1 is 5 day lagged volatility, pcratio_5_1 is 5 day lagged put call ratio, and turn_5_1 is 5 day
lagged turnover. Both standard and fixed effects regressions are run for short and put call ratios. The
variable “dummy” is 1 if an observation’s returns are less than -10%, and 0 otherwise. The variable after is
1 if the observation is dated after May 2, 2005, and zero otherwise, and the variable “afterdummy” is equal
to the product of the variables after and dummy for a given observation.
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Table IV: Short ratio
Stocks with options Stocks Without options
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
intercept .04157** .2216** .2288** .08221** .08429** .08293**
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
ret_5_1 .07108** .07119** .04199** .06371** .06476** .06387**
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
return .4781** .5145** .07122** .6063** .6463** .6459**
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
shortratio_5_1 .8159** .8163** .8163** .7303** .7309** .7306**
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Sigma .2674** .2216** .2288** .02335 -.02495 -.02495
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.3332) (.3208) (.3209)
sigma_5_1 .2029** .2293** .2288** -.09341* -.0731 -.07257
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0048) (.0279) (.0290)
Turn_5_1 .000249 .000196 .000204 .000312 .000139 .000116
(.1892) (.3002) (.2813) (.4142) (.7154) (.7622)
after -.0001 -.0002 .001857 .001745
(.8586) (.0803) (.1006)
dummy .05508** .03953** .06914 .05147
(<.0001) (.0002) (<.0001) (.0160)
afterdummy .01911 .02180
(.098) (.3521)
The regression coefficients for the first six variables in equation 1 confirm the findings of Diether, Lee, and
Werner (2009). Of the last three variables, only “dummy” is statistically significant in any of the regressions.
This suggests that short-sellers tend to target stocks that have fallen at least 10% in a single day despite
their generally contrarian behavior as seen in short-selling’s positive correlation with both contemporaneous
and lagged returns. Even though the results in table VII suggest that short sellers target stocks that have
fallen at least 10% in a day more than other stocks, the lack of a statistically significant coefficient in any of
the regressions for “after” or “afterdummy” would suggest that uptick restraints do not significantly change
this practice.
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Table V: put call Ratio
[1] [2] [3]
intercept .2039 .2050 .2027
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
ret_5_1 -.1928 -.19323 -.1932
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
return -1.0187 -1.1042 -1.1048
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
pcratio_5_1 .5037 .5041 .5040
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
sigma -.03885 .06759 .06829
(.3367) (.1084) (.1048)
sigma_5_1 -1.0716 -1.3334 -1.3320
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
turn_5_1 .007043 .007129 .007139
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
after .002679 .007139
(.0969) (.0933)
dummy -.1220 -.1454
(<.0001) (<.0001)
afterdummy .02843
(.3631)
Also, while it is true that table IV showed that average returns declined after the suspension of the
uptick rule, the fact that the variable “after” does not have a statistically significant coefficient in any of the
regressions run suggests that those lower returns are not the result of increased short-selling. This conclusion
is also robust to a hypothetical “alternative uptick world” in that the variable “afterdummy” also has no
statistically significant coefficient.
The negative correlation between the put call ratio and both contemporaneous and lagged returns suggests
that pessimistic, put-option traders follow a momentum strategy, targeting stocks with declining returns.
These results are consistent with Blau and Brough’s (2011) findings. Again, of the last three variables only
“dummy” is statistically significant in any of the regressions. However, “dummy” is inversely related to the
put call ratio, whereas it was positively related to short ratio. This would suggest that bearish option traders
naturally tend to shy away from stocks that are rapidly losing value independent of uptick-related short-
sale constraints, despite their general preference for stocks with declining returns. The lack of statistical
significance of the coefficients of “after” and “afterdummy” shows that uptick constraints have no statistically
significant effect on option trading.
13 Part II Conclusions
The fact that short-sellers tend to follow a contrarian strategy while option traders tend to follow a mo-
mentum strategy, except when stocks lose 10% of their value in a day which causes both types of traders to
change strategies, supports previous findings that short-sellers and option traders are fundamentally different
traders with different philosophies divided more by their chosen method of trading than their beliefs about
the direction that a given stock’s price will move. Whether or not the activities of short-sellers affect those
of short-sellers (or vice versa) will be further explored in the next section.
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14 Analysis of Uptick-Related Short-Sale Constraints’ Effects on
the Relationship Between the Short and Put Call Ratios
The empirical results generated in the last section raised several questions about potential, less obvious
effects that uptick rules could have on financial markets, and on the option market in particular. Because
pessimistic investors can still establish artificial short positions in the option markets, one can easily see how
these investors could side step uptick rules or any other short-sale restrictions for that matter. However, the
data examined in the previous section failed to show evidence of this behavior happening on a significant
scale. The fact that there was no significant change in the put call ratio before and after the implementation
of the general uptick rule (stocks that would have been affected by a hypothetical alternative uptick rule
also showed no significant change before and after the date of implementation). This does not mean that
restricting short-selling has no effect on the relationship between the short and put call ratios and the actions
of pessimistic traders.
In this final section I use the same data used in the previous section to create a vector autoregression
and ultimately an impulse response function in order to study the quantitative nature of the relationship
between the short and put call ratios, how each ratio responses to exogenous shocks and exogenous shocks
to the other variable, and whether or not one drives the other.
15 Process
First, subjecting the data to a Johansen Test (Johansen, 1558) showed the data to be cointegrated. The
very fact that the two variables are significantly cointegrated suggests that there is a long-term relationship
between the two variables suggests that they are related, but also suggests some econometric challenges.
This cointegration necessitated the use of a vector error correction model (VECM) to in order to produce
reliable impulse response functions. Once the VECM has adjusted for the cointegration impulse response
functions can be generated and the effect of exogenous shocks on the data can be studied.
Because the panel data is used in the study, data for each individual stock must be analyzed separately
and VECMs, VARs and IRFs must be generated for each stock individually. The resulting data can then
be analyzed and the statistical significance of changes in the responses of the short ratio and put call ratio
before and after the repealing of the general uptick rule on May 2, 2005 can be studied. Also, the same
process can be used with only data from stocks whose value have fallen at least 10% in a single day in the
period in question (i.e. stocks that would be affected by the alternative uptick rule) to allow us to study the
hypothetical effect of an alternative uptick rule as was also studied in part 2.
16 Results
After the cumulative impulse response for each stock is calculated, yielding four separate impulse responses
(short ratio response to a shock in the short ratio, put call ratio response to a shock in the short ratio, short
ratio response to a shock in the put call ratio, and put call ratio response to a shock in the put call ratio).
In the preceding univariate analysis of the impulse responses before and after the May 2, 2005 repealing of
the general uptick rule is performed. The presence of non-zero impulse response values on average and in
the overwhelming majority of individual cases indicates that there is not a clean, cause-effect relationship
does not exist between the short and put call ratios, but that they together constitute a feedback system. In
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both the general and alternative uptick studies positive shocks to the short ratio tend to negatively affect the
put call ratio and vice versa. However, this negative effect becomes positive once uptick-related short-sale
constraints are repealed. This finding is consistent with the previously discussed observation that short-
sellers and pessimistic option traders follow fundamentally different strategies, the former typically being
contrarian and the latter momentum traders.
General Uptick Rule Alternative Uptick Rule
Response of S.Ratio P.C. Ratio S.Ratio P.C. Ratio S.Ratio P.C. Ratio S.Ratio P.C. Ratio
to Shock in S.Ratio S.Ratio P.C. Ratio P.C. Ratio S.Ratio S.Ratio P.C. Ratio P.C. Ratio
Before
Mean 1.6675 -.3322 -.1900 1.2975 1.5202 -.8735 -.3551 1.4203
Min -.1814 -3.6017 -1.6275 .0114 .1499 -3.6017 -1.3087 .0199
Max 7.7572 3.8487 2.0583 2.8643 1.2884 2.6238 .8468 2.7895
Std Dev 1.6396 1.6555 .7656 .6780 1.3825 1.6718 .6796 .6809
After
Mean 1.1283 .0142 -.421 1.7322 .9934 .0648 -.0275 2.0078
Min .1499 -2.6128 -1.4492 .1568 .1543 -2.9468 -1.6901 .0199
Max 6.1823 2.1951 .0768 2.8539 5.4478 3.3897 1.1918 3.2933
Std Dev 1.1286 1.2480 .5699 .7476 1.0315 1.2566 .6369 .6449
Differences in Means (Before-After)
Difference .5391 -.3464 -.1479 -.4346 .5268 -.9383 -.3276 -.5875
t-stat 1.68 -1.08 -1.00 -3.10 2.18 -3.2 -2.3 -4.08
P Value .0955 .2799 .3175 .0023** .0306 .0017** .0228 .0001**
After the cumulative impulse response for each stock is calculated, yielding four separate impulse re-
sponses (short ratio response to a shock in the short ratio, put call ratio response to a shock in the short
ratio, short ratio response to a shock in the put call ratio, and put call ratio response to a shock in the
put call ratio). The preceding univariate analysis of the impulse responses before and after the May 2,
2005 repealing of the general uptick rule is performed. The presence of non-zero impulse response values
in on average and in the overwhelming majority of individual cases indicates that there is a clean, cause-
effect relationship does not exist between the short and put call ratios, but that they together constitute a
feedback system. In both the general and alternative uptick studies positive shocks to the short ratio tend
to negatively affect the put call ratio and vice versa. However, this negative effect becomes positive once
uptick-related short-sale constraints are repealed. This finding is consistent with the previously discussed
observation that short-sellers and pessimistic option traders follow fundamentally different strategies, the
former typically being contrarian and the latter momentum traders.
Initially under the general uptick rule the response of the short ratio to a positive shock in the short
ratio is positive and the response of the put call ratio to a positive shock in the put call ratio is positive as
well. Each ratio exhibits a negative response to a positive shock in the other ratio. The only statistically
significant change after the suspension of the general uptick rule is that the response of the put call ratio to
positive shocks in its own value increases.
If only stocks affected by the alternative uptick rule are studied the results are slightly different. A
positive shock to the short ratio negatively affects the put call ratio before the suspension of alternative
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uptick rule and positively after. This implies that a negative shock to the short ratio would cause a response
in the put call ratio. One explanation of this phenomenon could be that short-sellers, frustrated by their
inability to establish short positions, instead migrate to the options market where they can establish bearish
positions unrestricted. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is clearly untestable. However, the fact that after the
suspension of the alternative uptick rule the response of the put call ratio to a positive shock in the short
ratio becomes positive and the change is statistically significant lends support to the idea that the suspension
of the uptick rule ended the need for pessimistic traders’ migration to the options market. Also, because
this phenomenon is seen only in stocks affected by the alternative uptick rule it may be valid to conclude
that this migration only took place on a significant level where troubled stocks (that is, stocks that had lost
at least 10% of their value in a day during the period in question) were concerned.
17 Final Conclusions
Both the general and alternative uptick rules theoretically decrease informational efficiency, are shown em-
pirically to not significantly affect the short or put call ratios, and there is evidence that traders may have
used the options market to circumvent the rules. It is very likely that uptick-related short-sale constraints
are ineffective at best and harmful to markets at worst. Furthermore, the uptick rules fail to decrease the
short ratio, and therefore any significant decreases in returns or increases in volatility before and after May 5,
2005 cannot be reasonably attributed to the removal of uptick constraints. Finally, if the goal of constraining
short-selling is to decrease pessimistic “piling on” of stocks that are rapidly losing much of their value any
such constraint on short-selling is useless without a comparable restriction in the options market.
While further study is surely warranted, the outlook for the efficacy of uptick-related short-sale constraints
is dim. While regulators’ goal of stabilizing financial markets is noble, it would seem that they ought to
seek other ways to accomplish that goal. It is possible that the case can be made that constraining the
short-selling of severely distressed stocks may be beneficial, but uptick rules as presently constituted are too
broad in scope and hurt the performance of non-distressed stocks and reduce the informational efficiency
of the stock entire market. It is possible that the value of some stocks may fall precipitously for purely
behavioral, non-market related reasons, and perhaps much of this could be curtailed through careful, uptick
regulation, but it is hardly responsible to do so at the expense of the market as a whole.
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